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INTRODUCTION

In 1935, Congress attempted to reduce the adverse effects of industrial strife by enacting the National Labor Relations Act (the
"Act")' to equalize bargaining power and establish procedures for
the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. 2 The Act gave "employees" 3 the right to organize, to engage in concerted activities and to
* Debra Dyleski-Najjar is a 1983 magna cum laude graduate of Boston University
School of Law and a 1980 Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Wellesley College. She is an
associate at the firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart in Boston, Massachusetts, and practices in
the field of labor and employment law. While attending Boston University, Ms. DyleskiNajjar was an editor of the Boston University Law Review and published an article entitled "The National Labor Relations Board's Jurisdiction over Employers Contracting
with Exempt Public Entities."
1. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, §§ 1-19, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Section 1 of the Act, as amended, provides that the
denial by some employers of the right to employees to organize and the refusal
by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest which have the intent or the
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce .

. .

. Experience has

proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment or interruption ....
Id.
3.

Section 2(3) in relevant part defines an "employee" as "any employee... but not
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bargain collectively4 with their "employers." 5 The Act also created the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") to enforce
the Act's provisions and to resolve questions of representation
which affect commerce.6
In defining the word "employer," Congress expressly excluded
certain types of employers from the coverage of the Act, and thus
withheld the Act's protections from "employees" of such employers.7 Among the employers expressly excluded were the states,
political subdivisions and, from 1947 to 1974, nonprofit hospitals.'
includ[ing]... any individual employed as a supervisor.., or any.., person who is not
an 'employer'." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 of the Act provides that employees shall have
the right to "self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...
Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (definition of "employer"). For a discussion of § 152(2),
see infra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1982). The Board has been charged with responsibility for
adjudicating unfair labor practice complaints, resolving representation questions, and
conducting representation elections. Id. Section 10(a) empowers the Board to "prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting commerce." Id. at
§ 160(a). Unfair labor practices include, among other things, an employer's interference
with employees in their exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7, discrimination because
of union membership, and refusals to bargain collectively. Id. at § 158.
Section 9 gives the Board authority to resolve representation questions and to conduct
representation elections in units that it finds appropriate for the purpose of collective
bargaining. Id. at § 159. The Board, however, has statutory jurisdiction only over representation questions and unfair labor practices which "affect commerce." The limit of the
Board's jurisdictional authority has been found to be coextensive with Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1939);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937). The Board has placed
administrative limits upon its jurisdiction and will decline to exercise jurisdiction if the
employer does not satisfy the Board's revenue requirements. For a discussion of the
Board's administrative standards for declining jurisdiction under section 14(c) based on
revenue amounts, see Leedom v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., 294 F.2d 251, 255 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3) (1982). The Act provides that an "employee" shall
not include any individual employed by any person who is not an "employer." Id. at
§ 152(3). In defining the word "employee," Congress also expressly excluded certain
other individuals from the Act's protections. See supra note 3.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1947), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982). Prior to 1974,
section 2(2) provided:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or
political subdivision thereof, [or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual] ....

Id. In 1974, the bracketed language was deleted. See infra note 129 and accompanying
text.
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Congress believed that such entities should be subject to exclusive
local regulation and that their employees should not have the right
to strike which is guaranteed "employees" by the Act.9
In 1974, Congress amended the Act by deleting the nonprofit
hospital exemption.' 0 Many states had not at that time established
an effective mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.' Recognition strikes were increasing, and it became apparent that public health care services were being disrupted. As a
result of this situation, Congress deleted the nonprofit hospital exemption and enacted various safeguards designed to eliminate or
mitigate the effects of strikes which occurred in both nonprofit and
for-profit health care institutions.' 2 One of the most important
safeguards was a directive which instructed the Board to avoid the
undue proliferation of bargaining units in health care institutions.
Underlying this directive was congressional concern that the
proliferation of bargaining units could lead to jurisdictional dis3
putes, work stoppages, and other workplace strife.'
Since the enactment of the 1974 health care amendments, two
issues have prompted considerable disagreement between the
Board and the federal appellate courts. The first issue is whether
the Board violates the letter and spirit of the Act when it allows
professional organizations to represent rank and file employees despite the organizations' admission of supervisors to active membership.' 4 The second issue concerns how the Board should fulfill the
congressional mandate against undue proliferation of bargaining
units while at the same time guaranteeing health care employees
placement in a unit which will allow them the "fullest freedom" in
exercising their rights under the Act. '" Two recent decisions have
addressed these issues, and have attempted to balance the employees' "fullest freedom" in choosing a bargaining representative with
other public and private interests which militate toward some re9. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
11. See generally 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 437 (2d ed. 1983).
12. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
14. Congress and the Board have long recognized that a supervisor's active participation within a labor organization may conflict with the right of employees to have a bargaining representative with the single-minded purpose of representing unit employees'
interests, may conflict with employers' interests in the undivided loyalty of their supervisors, and may interfere with the collective bargaining process. See infra notes 33-35, 53
and accompanying text.
15. Section 9(b) of the Act provides that in representation cases, the Board shall
choose the appropriate unit in order to "assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by [the Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
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strictions upon this freedom. In each of these decisions, the employees' "fullest freedom" was restricted in order to further the
Act's paramount goal of encouraging effective collective bargaining
and thereby avoiding strikes and the disruption of commerce.
16
In a recent decision, NLRB v. North Shore University Hospital,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that whenever a professional association admits supervisors to active membership, the
Board must examine "all relevant circumstances including the governing structure and actual practices of the organization insofar as
the participation of supervisors is considered."' 7 The Court determined that only by making such an examination can the Board
ensure that bargaining activities are insulated from supervisory
interference. ' I
In St. FrancisHospital ("St. FrancisII"),19 a case concerning the
undue proliferation issue, the Board reconsidered the unit determination test which it had applied since enactment of the health care
amendments. The Board abandoned the traditional communityof-interests test, and adopted a disparity-of-interests test which requires a showing that "sharper than usual differences exist" between the employees in the petitioned-for unit and the employer's
other employees whenever representation of a unit smaller than all
professionals or all nonprofessionals is sought. If this burden is
met, the Board will grant the petitioned-for unit. The Board determined that the disaparity-of-interests test best fulfills the congres20
sional mandate against undue proliferation of bargaining units.
This article will analyze each of these decisions in light of congressional intent and will discuss the decisions' potential impact
upon health care employees and unions organizing health care
workers. First, this article will examine the history and purpose of
the amendment which excluded supervisors from the Act's protection. Next, the conflict-of-interest standards applied by the Board
in the health care context will be discussed. The article will then
analyze the North Shore University Hospital decision and its potential impact, and will propose methods by which health care unions
16. NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand, 274
N.L.R.B. No. 188, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,267 (1985).
17. Id. at 275.
18. Id. at 273.
19. 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984). The Board reconsidered its unit determination test in
St. FrancisII in apparent reaction to increasing criticism by several courts of appeal that
it had improperly been ignoring the congressional mandate. See infra notes 160-71 and
accompanying text.
20. 271 N.L.R.B. at 954.
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can mitigate the effects of the decision without undermining the
purposes of the Act.
Turning next to the Congressional mandate concerning nonproliferation of bargaining units, the article will examine the history and purpose of this mandate and the ways in which it was
applied by the Board during the first decade after passage of the
health care amendments. The St. FrancisII decision will then be
analyzed, and its potential impact assessed.
Finally, this article will evaluate both decisions in light of congressional intent. The article will conclude that the tests announced in St. Francis II and North Shore University Hospital,
when strictly applied, are consistent with the purposes and policies
of the Act. Although the tests may have the effect of limiting
health care employees' exercise of the 'fullest freedom" with respect to organizational rights, the tests strike the proper balance
between the sometimes conflicting interests of employees, employers, and the public, thus furthering the overriding goals of the Act.
II.

THE SUPERVISORY EXCLUSION

When Congress enacted the Act in 1935, supervisors were not
expressly excluded from its rights and protections. 2 ' Thus, the
Board was required to interpret the language and intent of the statute to determine whether supervisors were "employees '"22 entitled
to the organizational rights and protections of the Act.23
A.

The History and Purpose of the Supervisory Exclusion

In its early years, the Board generally held that employees and
their supervisors should not be included within the same bargaining unit.2 4 It was not until 1942, however, that the Board squarely
confronted the issue of whether supervisors were "employees"
under the Act.2 5 The Board concluded that supervisors were "employees" and that they could be represented in separate bargaining
units-even if the union representing them was affiliated with a
21. See generally 2 C. MORRIS, supra note 11, at 1451-52 (supervisors).
22. See supra note 3.
23. Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942) (supervisors).
24. See, e.g., General Motors Corp., 36 N.L.R.B. 439, 443 (1941) (shift operating
engineer was included in unit, but assistant and chief operating engineers were excluded);
General Motors Corp., 28 N.L.R.B. 793, 796 (1940) (chief engineer excluded from unit
because he was a supervisory and confidential employee). See generally I C. MORRIS,
supra note 11, at 453.
25. Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 968 (1942) (unit of assistant foreman, fire bosses, weigh bosses, and local inspectors).
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union that represented the rank and file employees whom they supervised.26 Congress, for policy reasons, reacted to the Board's determination by proposing amendments to the Act which, if passed,
would have overruled the Board's decision.2 7 The bill died in committee, however, when the Board reversed its policy and held that,
except in trades where foremen had organized prior to 1935, units
of supervisors would not be found appropriate for the purpose of
collective bargaining. 2 Two years later, the Board again reversed
its policy when, in PackardMotor Car Co. ,29 it held that supervisors would be allowed to organized and bargain collectively with
their employers 3° within the Act's protections. 31 Congress renewed
26. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874, 877 (1942) (certifying local as bargaining agent of working and nonworking foremen excluding general foreman).
27. H.R. 2239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942).
28. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943) (except in printing and maritime
trades, Board would no longer find units of foremen appropriate); see also Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943); Murray Corp. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 94 (1943).
In Maryland Drydock, the Board stated that it was reversing its earlier policy because
it was persuaded that the "benefits which supervisory employees might achieve through
being certified as collective bargaining units would be outweighed not only by the dangers, inherent in comingling of management and employee functions, but also in the possible restrictive effect upon the organizational freedom of rank and file employees." 49
N.L.R.B. at 740. The Board feared that the establishment of bargaining units composed
of supervisors exercising substantial managerial authority would impede the process of
collective bargaining, disrupt established managerial and production techniques, and interfere with the goals of the Act. Id. at 741.
29. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945) (finding that general foremen, assistant foremen and special
assignment foremen constituted an appropriate bargaining unit). In order to obtain further review of the Board's representation decision, the employer refused to bargain. In
the unfair labor practice proceeding, the employer raised the issue of whether the Board
had certified the proper bargaining unit. On review, the Board upheld its previous findings, and the courts enforced the Board's decision on appeal. Packard Motor Car Co., 64
N.L.R.B. 1212 (1945), enf'd, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), affid, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). See
infra note 30 for a discussion of the courts' analyses.
As a general rule, it is necessary for employers to refuse to bargain and commit an
unfair labor practice in order to obtain judicial review of issues resolved by the Board in
the representation proceeding. Pursuant to § 9(d) of the Act, Board decisions in representation proceedings are generally not reviewable by a court until an unfair labor practice has been committed. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), (d), 160(c) (1982). But see Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958) (permitting immediate review of representation proceeding when Board action is contrary to specific prohibitions of the Act). See generally A.
Cox, D. BOK & R. GORHAM, LABOR LAW 311-19 (9th ed. 1981) (discussing procedure
for review of Board representation proceedings).
30. The Board stated that the potential dangers inherent in comingling management
and employee functions which had concerned the Board majority in Maryland Drydock
do not materialize in cases where the petitioning union is independent and remains so. 61
N.L.R.B. at 17.
Upon review of the Board's Packarddecision in the context of an unfair labor practice
proceeding arising from Packard's refusal to bargain with the union, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court upheld the Board's extension of
the Act's protections to supervisors, and deferred to the Board's expertise regarding ap-
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its earlier proposal and, in 1947, amended the Act to exclude'32supervisory personnel from the Act's definition of "employees.
In legislatively overruling Packard, the Senate noted that the
"successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke the Wagner Act
for covering supervisory personnel [had] upset any real balance of
power in the collective bargaining process." 33 Both the Senate and
the House attributed an increase in accidents and strikes and a decrease in discipline and productivity to the Board's policy of permitting supervisors to be members of organizations affiliated with
organizations which represented rank and file employees.3 4 By excluding supervisors from the Act's protections, Congress clearly
intended to ensure (1) that rank and file employees would have the
right to organize and bargain free from undue influence by supervisors, and (2) that supervisors would loyally represent management
and direct and discipline rank and file employees.3 5
Although Congress amended the Act to exclude supervisors
from its rights and protections, it expressly allowed supervisors to
become and remain members of labor organizations for the purpose of bettering their own working conditions.36 Congress clearly
recognized, however, that supervisors should not be members of
propriate unit determination. NLRB v. Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F.2d 80, 86 (6th
Cir. 1946), afld, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). While the Supreme Court acknowledged that
unionization of foremen may be bad from the perspective of industrial policy because it
divides the supervisors' loyalty, it upheld the Board's decision because the Act unambiguously defined the term "employee" to include any employee. The Supreme Court stated
that the policy arguments concerning the wisdom of the legislation should be directed to
Congress, which had the authority to create exceptions or qualifications to the Act. 330
U.S. at 490, 492, 493.
31. 61 N.L.R.B. at 17.
32. See supra note 8.
33. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, at 409 (1947) (hereinafter cited as LEG.
HIST. 1947).
34. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note
33, at 410; H. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1947,
supra note 33, at 304-05.
35. H. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8, 14, reprinted in LEG. HIST. 1947,
supra note 33, at 296, 299, 305; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, reprinted in
LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 409-11.
The Act defines a supervisor as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline
other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances,
or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
36. Section 14(a) provides that:
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organizations that represent rank and file employees.17
B. Board Treatment of the Supervisory Exclusion Issue
Despite this clear expression of Congressional intent, the Board
has continued to certify labor organizations as representatives of
rank and file employees even though such organizations admit supervisors to active union membership. Although the issue of
whether a labor organization should be disqualified because it admits supervisors to membership can arise in any industry, it has
since the 1974 amendments arisen primarily in the health care context. a" The American Nurses Association and many of its affiliated
state nurses associations have admitted supervisors to membership
while increasingly pursuing collective bargaining on behalf of rank
and file nurses. a9
Nothing [in the Act] shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor
from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer
subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined ... as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law . . . relating to collective
bargaining.
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1982). Apparently Congress recognized that in some industries, supervisory personnel had traditionally formed unions and successfully bargained with
management. See 93 CONG. REc. 3556 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1947), reprinted in LEG. HIST.
1947, supra note 33, at 652 (statement of Mr. Klein); 93 CONG. REC. 4480 (daily ed. May

1, 1947), reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 1162 (statement of Sen. Murray);
H. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at

308.
Section 14(a), however, was probably included in the Act, out of an abundance of
caution, to make clear Congress' intent that the amendment should not be construed as
unconstitutionally depriving supervisors of their freedom of association. Section 14(a)
gives supervisors no greater rights than they would have under the Constitution because
unlike "employees," they have no ability or right either to require their employers to
bargain or to protect themselves against reprisals for union activities.
37.

93 CONG. REC. 3553 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1947), reprinted in LEG. HIST. 1947,

supra note 33, at 647 (statement of Rep. Gwinn); 93 CONG. REC. 6660 (daily ed. June 6,
1947), reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 1576 (statement of Sen. Murray);
93 CONG. REC. 6686 (daily ed. June 6, 1947), reprinted in LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note

33, at 1606 (statement of Sen. Pepper).
Congress rejected a proposal which would have deprived supervisors of protection
under the Act "only where the circumstances present a real possibility of collusion with
organizations of nonsupervisory employees." 93 CONG. REC. 15105 (daily ed. May 9,
1947), reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 1452 (statement of Sen. Murray).
This proposal would have denied labor organizations the protection of the Act where
they admitted supervisors and also (1) represented rank and file workers or (2) were
affiliated with or controlled by organizations of such workers. Id.
38.

See generally 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 11, at 436-38.

39. The American Nurses Association's (ANA) collective bargaining program was
first launched in 1946. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILATION SERVICE, IMPACT OF
THE 1974 HEALTH CARE AMENDMENTS TO THE NLRA ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 88 (1979) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT]. In 1974,
however, only about one-third of the ANA's members were covered by collective bar-
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Because the nurses associations are professional organizations,
the associations-as well as employers-have encouraged all
nurses to participate in the associations' professional activities, and
the associations have allowed supervisory nurses to retain professional membership. 4° When nurses associations have sought to
bargain collectively, however, employers have argued that the associations should be disqualified because the active participation of
supervisors gives rise to the "conflicts of interest" which Congress
intended to avoid by excluding supervisors from the Act's protections in 1947.41
1. The Conflict-of-Interest Doctrine
Since 1954, the Board has refused to certify a union as a collective bargaining representative of rank and file employees whenever
it determines that the union has a "disqualifying conflict of interest."42 Underlying the Board's conflict-of-interest doctrine is the
long established principle that:
employees have the right to be represented in collective bargaining by a union which has the single-minded purpose of protecting
and advancing their interests vis-a-vis the employer and there
must be no ulterior purpose. Where the union has direct and
immediate allegiances which can fairly be said to conflict with its
function of protecting and advancing the interests of the employees it represents, it cannot be a proper representative. 43
In developing the conflict-of-interest doctrine, the Board has
identified two types of disqualifying conflicts. The first is a condition that inherently creates a danger of a conflict; 44 the second is a
gaining agreements. Id. After the health care amendments were enacted, see infra note
129 and accompanying text, the ANA expanded its collective bargaining programs and
during the decade since 1974, 31 of its members have become covered by collective bargaining agreements. STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIC & GENERAL WELFARE
PROFILE

1985 (compiled by ANA).

40. Supervisors are often allowed to serve professional associations in various capacities. For example, they may serve on the board of directors, on nominating committees,
on advisory councils for the bargaining arm, and as officers of the district councils. See,
e.g., NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1983); Sidney
Farber Cancer Inst., 247 N.L.R.B. 1, 3 (1980).
41. See NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1983).
42. Bausch and Laumb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
43. Medical Foundation of Bellaire, 193 N.L.R.B. 62, 64 (1971) (footnotes omitted);
see also Welfare & Pension Funds, 178 N.L.R.B. 14 (1969).
44. When an interest falls within this category, the employer need only show the
factual existence of the condition which could give rise to a conflict and need not demonstrate that the union actually abused its role'as a bargaining representative. Conditions
which fall into this first category include those in which (1) the union's representatives
constitute a majority of the members of the employer's governing board, see, e.g., Medical
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condition that disqualifies only if the employer can demonstrate
that the interest presents a "clear and present danger" of disrupting the bargaining process.45
2. Disqualification of Nurses Associations
When employers first began asserting that the Board could not
properly certify state nurses associations because the associations
were subject to the influence, domination and control of supervisors, the Board announced that it would refuse to certify the associations unless they delegated bargaining authority to
autonomous local chapters controlled by nonsupervisory employees. 46 By conditioning certification upon the delegation of bargaining authority, the Board thus avoided addressing directly the
conflict-of-interest issue.
As a result of the Board's decision, the state nurses associations
attempted to delegate bargaining authority by permitting local
units to establish separate unit bylaws, elect unit officers, select negotiating committees from their own ranks, formulate bargaining
proposals, and ratify final contract proposals. 47 The state associations, however, through their Economic and General Welfare program ("EGW"), continued to assist the local units in collective
Foundation of Bellaire, 193 N.L.R.B. 62, 64 (1971); Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181
N.L.R.B. 135, 140 (1970); (2) the employer's major source of revenue is derived from the
union's welfare fund, see, e.g., Welfare & Pension Funds, 178 N.L.R.B. 14 (1969); and
(3) the union is a customer or supplier of the employer or in competition with the employer, see, e.g., St. John's Hosp., 264 N.L.R.B. 990, 993 (1982) (control and operation of
a nurse's registry); Harlem River Consumer's Coop., Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 314 (1971) (business agent had financial interest in a competing business); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1562 (1954) (competing business).
45. When an interest falls within this second category, the employer must show by
direct evidence a likelihood that the conflict will endanger the bargaining process. The
two major conflicts of interest in this category are those in which (1) the union has made
a loan to the employer or one of its competitors, see, e.g., NLRB v. David Buttrick Co.,
399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968); Bridgeport Jai Alai, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1519, 1520
(1977); or (2) the union admits supervisors employed by a third party to membership.
See, e.g., NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269, 269 (2d Cir. 1983); Apex
Tankers Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 685, 685 (1981).
46. See, e.g., Sisters of Charity, 225 N.L.R.B. 799, 799 (1976); Sierra Vista Hosp.,
Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1976); Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 848
(1975).
In the early cases, the Board conditioned certification upon the association's delegation
of bargaining authority. Such procedures were found to be improper under the Act, and
the Board discontinued the practice. N.L.R.B. v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n,
561 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding conditional certification improper); Sierra Vista
Hosp., Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 631 (1979) (announcing the Board's discontinuance of the
practice of conditioning certification).
47. See NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524, 531 (4th Cir.
1977); Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1088 (1976).
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bargaining. 8 Employers continued to argue that the associations
should be disqualified, despite the delegation of bargaining authority, because of the associations' involvement in the bargaining process through EGW. 49 The Board, however, routinely certified the
state associations and rejected the employers' arguments, holding
that the state associations had effectively delegated collective bargaining authority and that the control exercised by supervisory
personnel was too indirect to create a conflict of interest.50
3.

Sierra Vista III

Upon review of the Board's decision in NLRB v. Annapolis
Emergency Hospital Association,5 however, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with the employers that the state associations had not effectively delegated bargaining authority because the
state associations retained the ability to influence the bargaining
activities of the local units. This decision, in conjunction with employers' repeated opposition to supervisor participation in state
nurses associations, forced the Board to address the conflict-of-interest issue. In Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., ("Sierra Vista 111)52
the Board clarified its test for determining when participation of
supervisors disqualifies a labor organization as a bargaining representative. The Board acknowledged that in certain circumstances
a supervisor's membership in a labor organization may create a
conflict of interest and compromise the employees' right to effec48. Through the EGW, the state association usually assigns a professional staff negotiator to assist local units in developing bargaining proposals and in negotiating with their
employers. See, e.g., NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir.
1983); NLRB v. Annalgolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524, 538-39 (2d Cir. 1977).
49. The directors of the state associations promulgate EGW and collective bargaining
policies, hire the director of EGW, require the EGW director to make periodic reports,
and allocate monies to EGW and its programs. Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B.
1086, 1088 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Sisters of Charity, 225 N.L.R.B. 799 (1976); Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc.,
225 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1088 (1976).
51. 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977). The court declined to enforce the Board's order on
the grounds that (1) conditional certification was improper as a matter of law, and (2) the
Board's finding that the nurses association would have no voice or control in actual collective bargaining lacked substantial evidentiary support. The court concluded that the
nurses association had not effectively delegated its bargaining authority to the local because the state association retained the power of the purse, participated in the bargaining
process by furnishing the local units with advice and guidance on collective bargaining
goals and strategies, participated in bargaining sessions, established rules (including a nostrike policy) which were binding on the locals, and could discipline a nurse for violation
of such rules. Id. at 538-39. Thus, the court concluded that the independence of the
local was more illusory than real. Id. at 539.
52. 241 N.L.R.B. 631, 632-33 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sierra Vista III].
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tive, "single-minded" representation. 3 The Board, however, distinguished cases in which supervisors of the bargaining unit
employees are active in the association from those in which supervisors employed by third parties are active. With regard to the
former, the Board stated that the role of the supervisor in the association's internal affairs must be examined in order to determine
whether the supervisor is subject to divided loyalties which create
an inherent conflict of interest. 4 This conflict might compromise
the interests of both labor and management.55
With regard to the latter scenario, where a third-party supervisor is active, the Board stated that it would not disqualify a nurses
association absent a "demonstrated connection" between the thirdparty supervisor's employer and the employer of the unit employees. Disqualification will be ordered, said the Board, when the
"demonstrated connection" gives rise to a clear and present danger
of a conflict that may interfere with the collective bargaining
process.56
53. Sierra Vista III, 241 N.L.R.B. at 633.
54. When a labor organization seeks to bargain with an employer whose supervisors
are active in the affairs of a labor organization, a question arises about the labor organization's ability to deal with the employer at arm's length. Sierra Vista III, 241 N.L.R.B. at
633. Such active participation by the employer's own supervisors may contravene the
employer's interest in having the undivided loyalty of its supervisors as well as the employees' interests in having a representative whose sole concern is for the unit employees'
interests. Id.
The Board's decisions suggest that the active participation of the employer's own supervisors in bargaining gives rise to an "inherent" conflict. To disqualify a labor organization in such cases, the Board has merely required the employer to establish that its own
supervisors are active in negotiations. See, e.g., Apex Tankers Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 685
(1981). The conflict, in fact, is so marked that the Board has not only found the union
disqualified, but has also stated that the employer has a duty not to bargain with labor
organizations as a representative of the rank and file employees when such situations
exist. See, e.g., Banner Yarn Dyeing Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1962); Nassau & Suffolk
Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957).
The Board's decisions are less clear with regard to whether the active participation of
the employer's own supervisors in the higher echelons of the labor organization gives rise
to an inherent conflict of interest. The cases suggest, however, that an inherent conflict
will not be found. See, e.g., Abington Memorial Hosp., 250 N.L.R.B. 682, 683 (1980).
The Board will therefore examine the role which the supervisor assumes within the organization to determine whether such participation disqualifies the organization as a bargaining representative. Sierra Vista III, 241 N.L.R.B. at 631.
55. Sierra Vista III, 241 N.L.R.B. at 633. The Board noted that if the employer's
own supervisor were present on the opposite side of the bargaining table, the employer
would be obligated to refuse to bargain because of the conflict created. Id. (citing Welsbach Electric Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 503 (1978); Banner Yarn Dyeing Corp., 139 N.L.R.B.
1018 (1962); Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957)).
56. Although the employer's legitimate interest in the loyalty of its supervisors is not
in issue when a third party's supervisors are active in the nurses association, the Board
has recognized that the presence of such supervisors may impinge upon the employees'
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Thus after Sierra Vista III, the focus of the Board's analysis
shifted from the issue of whether the state association had effectively delegated bargaining authority to the underlying issue of
whether the supervisors' activities created a conflict of interest. In
practice, however, the final results of the two analyses were identical. Whenever the Board determined that the association had effectively delegated bargaining authority to a local unit of
nonsupervisory employees, it also concluded that any influence of
supervisors active within the association was too indirect to disqualify the association as a bargaining representative. 7
Moreover, because the Board jealously guarded the associations'
internal affairs against employers' intrusions, it was very difficult
for employers to obtain the evidence necessary to demonstrate that
a "clear and present danger" to the bargaining process existed as a
result of the supervisors' activities. As a matter of course, the
Board was unwilling to allow employers to inquire into an association's internal structure without a prior showing that the supervisors' activities gave rise to a conflict of interest.5 8 Because
employers were not permitted to engage in effective discovery, they
were generally unable to meet the initial burden or to substantiate
their claims that a conflict existed. 9 Only in the clearest case,
when the employees' own supervisors were active in bargaining
with the employer, could the employer generally prove the requisite conflict of interest.60
Furthermore, even in those cases in which the employer was permitted to inquire into the association's internal structure, practices,
and policies, it was extremely difficult for the employer to meet the
right to a bargaining representative whose undivided concern is for their interests, and
may impede collective bargaining. Sierra Vista III, 241 N.L.R.B. at 633. The Board,
however, noted that even if third-party supervisors were to constitute a majority of a
nurses association's board of directors, the association would not necessarily be disqualified unless there existed some other demonstrated conflict of interest which posed a clear
and present danger to meaningful bargaining. Id. The Board has declined to find that
the active participation of a third-party employer's supervisors gives rise to an inherent
conflict of interest, and has only recently disqualified a labor organization because of the
activities of a third party's supervisors. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Sidney Farber Cancer Inst., 247 N.L.R.B. 1, 4 (1980); Lodi Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n, 249 N.L.R.B. 786, 787 (1980).
58. See, e.g., Natonal Medical Convalescent, 254 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1355 (1981); Sidney
Farber Cancer Inst., 247 N.L.R.B. 1 (1980); Rockford Memorial Ass'n, 247 N.L.R.B.
319, 320 (1980); Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 246 N.L.R.B. 600, 601 n.5 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Rockford Memorial Ass'n, 247 N.L.R.B. 319, 320, 320 n.5 (1980) (denying enforcement of employer's subpoena duces tecum); Lodi Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
249 N.L.R.B. 786, 788 n.4 (1980); Healdsburg Gen. Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. 212, 212-13
(1980).
60. See, e.g., Apex Tankers Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 685, 685 (1981).
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very high burden of showing a "demonstrated connection" between it and the third-party employer of supervisors.6" In order to
meet this burden, the employer was required to present evidence of
explicit supervisory interference in the particular bargaining unit.62
Absent such evidence, which was unlikely to exist because of the
at-least surface "delegation" of bargaining authority to the local
units,63 it was virtually impossible for employers to demonstrate
that a third-party supervisor's activities gave rise to a conflict of
interest.
Thus, as a practical matter the Board, despite legislative intent
to the contrary, has refused to acknowledge-except in cases where
the employees' own supervisors are active in bargaining-that conflicts may result from supervisors' membership in the same union
that represents rank and file employees. This position has
prompted criticism from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
which took exception to the Sierra Vista III test, particularly as
applied to those cases in which third-party supervisors actively
participate in the very union which seeks to represent an employer's rank and file employees."4
C. North Shore University Hospital
1. The Second Circuit's Criticism of the Board's
Sierra Vista III Test
In North Shore University Hospital,65 the Board refused to disqualify the New York State Nurses Association (the "SNA") as a
collective bargaining representative of the North Shore University
Hospital's rank and file nurses. Applying the Sierra Vista III analysis, the Board found that the unit's bargaining activities were sufficiently insulated from interference by supervisors active in the
internal affairs of the SNA.66
Examining the issue on appeal, however, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed with both the Board's conclusion and
its analysis. 67 The Second Circuit ruled that the Board had erred
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., North Shore Univ. Hosp., 259 N.L.R.B. 852, 863 (1981), rev'd, 724 F.2d
269 (1983); Abington Memorial Hosp., 250 N.L.R.B. 682, 682 (1980); Lodi Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n, 249 N.L.R.B. 786, 788 (1980).
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
64. NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1983).
65. 259 N.L.R.B. 852 (1981).
66. Id. at 865.
67. NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand,
274 N.L.R.B. No. 188, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
17,267 (1985).
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by certifying the SNA as a bargaining representative of the hospital's nurses. 6 1 The court concluded that the Sierra Vista III test,
which limited the conflict of interest inquiry to proof of explicit
supervisory interference, "inadequate[ly] ...effectuate[d] the policies of the Act in cases of multi-purpose professional organizations
representing thousands of employees in numerous bargaining
units."

69

In order to ensure that supervisors do not improperly dominate
or interfere with the unit employees' collective bargaining activities, the court reasoned that the Board's inquiry must extend to
"all relevant circumstances, including the governing structure and
actual practice of the organization . . . so far as participation by
supervisors is concerned." 7 ° The court concluded that the Board's
refusal to examine the general structure and practices of the nurses
association served to avoid rather than resolve the complex issues
raised by supervisory participation.7" The appellate court chastised
the Board for its cavalier attitude, which deemed irrelevant "some
of the most cogent evidence relating to conflict of interest." 2
The court's statement that the Board must inquire into "all relevant circumstances" was predicated on several factors. First,
where both supervisors and rank and file employees participate actively in a professional organization, the supervisors are subjected
to conflicting pressures by virtue of their relationships to the employer and the organization.7 3 Second, supervisors as a class have
interests of their own, and an organization which is itself governed
in part by supervisors will tend to reflect those interests.7 4 Third,
evidence of explicit interference in collective bargaining may not be
available even in cases in which the structure of a professional organization leads to pervasive supervisory influence.7 5 Fourth,
68. Id.
69. Id. at 273.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 273. The court stated that since the nurses association and the employer
are the two most important entities affecting the supervisor's career, conflicts of interest
indisputably occurred both within the organization and on the job. Id.
74. Id. The court noted that the authority of supervisors over rank and file employees
is usually a major issue in collective bargaining, and that an organization in which supervisors play a significant governing role will have difficulty reflecting only the views of the
rank and file on the issue. Id. The court stated that it is "tunnel vision" to assume that
this influence will be of importance only when a supervisor of employees in a particular
unit is a member of the board of directors of the certified bargaining representative. Id.
75. Id. The court stated that supervisors active in union affairs may have control not
only over rank and file employees' working conditions, but also over the employees' roles
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where supervisors are active in the internal affairs of the rank and
file employees' bargaining representative, actual violations of the
Act attributable to employers appear inevitable.76
Turning to an examination of the governing structure of the
SNA and its practices concerning supervisors, the Second Circuit
concluded that
the influence of supervisors within the SNA was
' 7
"ubiquitous."

The Court stated that if the SNA were an indus-

trial union its disqualification would be justified as a matter of
law7" due to (1) the active role of supervisors in the union's governance, (2) the lack of insulation of the bargaining process from that
governance, and (3) the lack of any mechanism to assist employers
in preventing their supervisors from violating the Act through
union activities. 79 Rather than disqualifying the SNA, however,
the court remanded the case to allow the Board to determine appropriate methods for insulating the collective bargaining process
from supervisory interference and preventing supervisors from violating the Act through their activities within the professional organization. 8 0

The

court

suggested

that

on

remand

some

in the professional organization. Id. at 273-74. Thus, the Court reasoned that the more
pervasive the influence, the more difficult it may be to prove, due to the various and
subtle ways in which supervisors may be able to exert influence.
76. Id. at 274. Section 8(a)(2) of the Act declares it unlawful for employers to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization. 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). The court reasoned that when a hospital's supervisors are
active in a labor organization, such activities will lead to systematic violations of section
8(a)(2). 274 F.2d at 274.
77. 274 F.2d at 275.
78. Id. at 275.
79. Id. The court stated that:
Quite apart from the formal structure in which supervisors vote on various matters, status as a senior member of SNA and supervisory authority within a
health care facility often go together and it is well nigh inevitable that some of
SNA's most active members will also be supervisors. SNA's board of directors,
its ultimate governing authority to which the executive director and other staff
employees must report, has supervisors as members. The nominating committee, which has great influence in determining who will become an officer or
director, was chaired by a supervisor from North Shore Hospital at the time of
the election. Little, if anything, has been done to insulate collective bargaining
activities from the governance of the organization generally. The staff members
who advise organized nurses and negotiate on their behalf serve at the pleasure
of SNA's board. Even the EGW advisory council has supervisors as members,
as did a task force on SNA's no-strike policy. District 14, which collects information on wages, hours, etc., of nurses, key information in developing bargaining demands, was chaired by a supervisor from North Shore Hospital.
Supervisors have used a district meeting to voice opposition to the representation of rank and file nurses by a competing union. Finally, SNA seems quite
prepared to refuse to cooperate with employers in seeing that Section 8(a)(2) is
not systematically violated by the activities of supervisory nurses in SNA.
80. Id. at 275-76.
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distinctions between professional associations and industrial unions
might emerge to justify separate rules.8 '
2.

The Board's Decision on Remand

The Board on remand declined to establish special rules governing the disqualification of professional associations due to supervisory participation in internal union affairs.8 2 Instead, it stated
that it would continue to apply the same standards which it uses to
determine whether industrial unions are disqualified because of supervisors' participation.83
Adopting the Second Circuit's reasoning as the law of the case,
the Board agreed that the SNA was disqualified as a collective bargaining representative.8 4 It concluded that the active participation
of supervisory personnel in the SNA, the lack of insulation of the
collective bargaining process from the governance of the organization, and the lack of a mechanism to prevent employer violations
of the Act combined to present a clear and present danger of a
conflict of interest.8 The Board therefore revoked the SNA's certification and vacated its prior decision, in which it had found that
the hospital had violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the
SNA.86
3.

The Impact of the Test

Unfortunately, on remand the Board declined to establish guidelines to assist organizations that wish to admit supervisors to active
membership yet avoid disqualification. Furthermore, because the
Board has not reviewed any other cases presenting similar issues
since North Shore University Hospital was decided, the burden has
fallen upon regional directors and administrative law judges to determine the extent to which supervisors can participate in a labor
organization, and the roles which supervisors may assume within
the organization, without disqualifying the organization from
bargaining.87
In the absence of any limiting guidelines, the all-relevant-circumstances test has opened the internal structures of professional
81.
82.
17,267
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 275.
North Shore Univ. Hosp., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 188, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
(1985).
Id. at 29,702.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See generally 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 11, at 452-54.
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labor organizations to public scrutiny. Employers have been given
wide latitude to subpoena documents and examine witnesses regarding the innermost workings of the professional organizations. 8
The test has thus achieved the very end which the Sierra Vista III
test 9 was designed to avoid-fishing expeditions and protracted
representation proceedings which may impair employees' organizational interests. 90
It is clear that continued application of the all-relevant-circumstances test will necessitate some fundamental changes in the structure of state nurses associations, the manner in which such
associations participate in bargaining activities, or both. Moreover, unless nurses associations are willing to expend the time and
expense necessary to defend their qualifications in representation
and unfair labor practice proceedings under the rigorous and intrusive North Shore University Hospital test, they must elect one of
two courses. They must either refuse to admit supervisors to active
membership or cease representing rank and file members in collective bargaining activities by delegating actual bargaining authority
to the local unit as the certified representative of the union employees. 9 ' Although neither of these two options may appear desirable
in the abstract, the latter may constitute the only effective means of
insulating collective bargaining from supervisory interference while
preserving other avenues of participation for state associations and
preventing intrusion into the associations' internal affairs.
D. Analysis
In excluding supervisors from the Act's protections, Congress
recognized that employers deserve the undivided loyalty of their
supervisors and that employees should be free from supervisory influence over bargaining activities. 92 Although Congress expressly
88. In declining to enforce the Board's 1981 North Shore UniversityHospital decision
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the Board's inquiry "must extend to all
relevant circumstances, including the governing structure and actual practice of the organization." North Shore Univ. Hosp., 274 F.2d at 273 (emphasis added). Thus, information to which the Board had previously refused employers access has clearly fallen within
the scope of discoverable information. See generally supra notes 58-59.
89. See supra note 54.
90. Sierra Vista III, 241 N.L.R.B. at 635.
91. Some associations that have been willing to defend challenges to their qualifications have sought to amend their constitutions and bylaws in an effort better to insulate
collective bargaining activities. Such associations must, however, bear internal scrutiny
and the costs of defending their bona fide statuses. See ST. FRANCIS MONITOR (BNA
Mar. 1986); Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, Constitution and By-laws of 1985.
92. See supra notes 31-32.
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stated that supervisors may become and remain members of a labor
organization notwithstanding their exemption from the protections
of the Act, 93 the legislative history clearly indicates that supervisors should only be members of unions that are "separate and distinct" from those unions representing rank and file employees. 94
By failing to disqualify nurses associations that admit supervisors
to membership, as it did in Sierra Vista III and other cases, the
Board has compromised the overriding purposes of the Act and
violated congressional intent.
1. Supervisors Employed by the Employer
Although the Board in Sierra Vista III recognized that a supervisor's activities in a labor organization which has rank and file
employees as members may result in a conflict of interest, it stated
that whether a conflict in fact existed depended upon the supervisor's role in the association's internal affairs. 95 As a matter of
course, the Board found a disqualifying conflict only when the supervisor was active in bargaining.96 This analysis failed to recognize that the role of the supervisor in the workplace may be
compromised as a result of the supervisor's dual loyalties, irrespective of the types of activities in which the supervisor participates
within the association.
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in North
Shore University Hospital, the nurses association and the employer
are the two most important entities in a nurse's professional career. 97 When a supervisor's loyalties are divided between the employer and the organization representing rank and file employees,
employers' interests in maintaining efficiency and discipline in the
workplace are compromised. 9 Thus, by focusing merely upon the
supervisors' influence over the bargaining process during negotiations, the Board under the Sierra Vista III test totally ignored the
impact that such divided loyalties may have on the overall bargaining relationship, which includes administration of the terms of the
bargaining agreement and the agreement's grievance procedures.
Because supervisors by definition must monitor and discipline,
93. See supra note 36.
94. See supra note 35. In fact, Congress rejected an amendment which would have
permitted supervisors to remain "employees" under the Act and would have given the
Board discretion to disqualify an organization whenever it found a conflict to exist. Id.
95. Sierra Vista 111, 241 N.L.R.B. at 633.
96. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
97. 724 F.2d at 273.
98. See supra notes 29-32, 92-95 and accompanying text.
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they play an integral role in the enforcement and administration of
the employer's policies.99 If their loyalties are divided, however,
supervisors may not be able to administer the employer's disciplinary policies and participate in the grievance and arbitration procedures as loyal representatives of management. Divided loyalties
may impede the orderly resolution of labor disputes and prompt
the very disruptions that Congress sought to avoid. "
Thus, while the Board has permitted the nurses associations' admission of supervisors to membership in order to ensure nurses the
"fullest freedom" in selecting a bargaining representative, this policy has undermined the overriding goal of the Act and has disrupted the balance of power between employers and employees.
This disruption is evidenced by the increased number of strikes
which have occurred in the health care industry since nurses associations have expanded their bargaining activities.'
The
Board's policy has created industrial strife'0 2 and has harmed the
0 3
public by contributing to the disruption of health care services.
To achieve the paramount goal of the Act, the Board should
decline to certify a labor organization as the bargaining representative of rank and file employees whenever the unit employees' supervisor is a member of the labor organization. Only by such a
practice can the Board protect the interests of employers in the
effective management of the workforce while furthering congressional intent and the Act's goal of achieving industrial harmony.

99. In addition to participating in the grievance and arbitration process when bargaining unit nurses are involved, supervisors may also be active in the administration of
the grievance procedures of employees represented by other unions.
100. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
101. Between 1974 and 1980, the number of strikes in health care institutions increased from 44 to 99 per year, and the number of idle days per year increased from
263,700 to 565,100. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES (1974-1980). During the same period, the total number of
work stoppages in the United States for all industries decreased by more than one half,
and the number of idle days decreased by one third. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS

409 (June 1985) (strikes involv-

ing more than 1000 workers). After 1980, the Department of Labor ceased collecting
data regarding strikes in health care institutions involving less than 1000 workers. Thus
it is impossible to compare the years following 1980 with the strike trend that occurred
between 1974 and 1980.
102. The Board's conduct has led to strikes not only by nurses, but also by other
health care employees due to the conflicts created when nurses supervise non-nurses.
Supervisory nurses may seek to further the nurses association's interests when disciplining non-nurse employees or participating in grievance procedures. In a grievance involving job duties, for example, the supervisory nurse's loyalties may be divided because the
non-nurses' claim to the work may encroach upon the work jurisdiction of the registered
nurses. 724 F.2d at 274-75.
103. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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2.

As recognized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in North
Shore University Hospital, the conflict of interest problem which
arises when supervisors employed by third parties are active in the
nurses association are distinct from those which arise when the
unit employees' supervisor is active." ° Moreover, the conflicts
which arise in the third-party situation can largely be avoided by
proper insulation of the bargaining process from supervisory influence. Although the Sierra Vista III test recognized the unique
problems which arise in this context, it failed to allow employers
access to the organizations' internal affairs to obtain evidence regarding the various ways in which supervisors' activities may affect
collective bargaining. 101
The all-relevant-circumstances test articulated in North Shore
University Hospital will better effectuate congressional intent by allowing employers to obtain the evidence necessary to demonstrate
the ways in which supervisors may be able to influence the rank
and file employees' bargaining activities. The test, however, may
impair the organizational freedom of employees. 106 Under the test,
employers are given the opportunity to protract representation
proceedings, to threaten to petition the Board for revocation of the
organization's certification, and to engage in fishing expeditions
which inquire into the inner workings of the labor organization. 0 7
Thus, although it may be theoretically possible for a nurses association to construct a barrier by which collective bargaining may be
insulated from supervisory influence, the organization's internal
structure would nevertheless be subject to continual scrutiny because the barrier could be breached at any time. Although the allrelevant-circumstances test may be necessary to ensure that the
presence and activities of supervisors do not undermine employees'
interests in "single-minded" representation, nurses associations
may be unable-economically and administratively-to bear the
test's continual scrutiny or to constantly monitor collective bargaining activities in order to ensure insulation from supervisory
influence.
3.

Achieving the Act's Overriding Goal

By focusing on the Act's subsidiary goal of allowing employees
104.
105.
106.
107.

724
See
See
See

F.2d at 273.
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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the "fullest freedom" in selecting a bargaining representative, the
Board, applying the Sierra Vista III test, apparently assumed that
the Act's overriding goal of industrial harmony would also be
achieved. Between 1974 and 1980, however, the number of strikes
in health care institutions more than doubled. 10 8 This increase is
attributable at least in part to the conflicts created by the Board's
failure to disqualify labor organizations that admit supervisors to
membership. 109
In examining representation issues, the Board must focus upon
the Act's overriding goal and attempt to harmonize it with the subsidiary goal of employees' "fullest freedom." The latter, however,
must be viewed only as a means to the ultimate end and may be
achieved only in a manner consistent with the Act's overall
purposes.
As properly applied, the North Shore University Hospital test will
effectuate congressional intent, because it properly recognizes that
some limitations must be placed on employees' "fullest freedom"
in order to achieve industrial harmony. The test, however, is undeniably intrusive upon the labor organization's internal affairs and,
as a practical matter, may (1) deter the organization from pursuing
a representation petition if the employer challenges the organization's qualifications, or (2) upset the balance of power between the
labor organization and the employer because the employer can
threaten to petition to have the organization disqualified if difficulties arise. 110
Professional organizations should respond to the North Shore
University Hospital decision by reevaluating the manner in which
they participate in collective bargaining activities on behalf of rank
and file members. This article proposes that as a means of harmonizing the competing interests and achieving industrial harmony
without allowing wholesale intrusion into the organizations' internal affairs, the nurses associations should delegate bargaining au108. See supra note 101.
109. Other factors which contributed to the rising number of strikes include the increasing organizational activities of health care unions and the Board's failure to give due
regard to Congress' nonproliferation mandate. See IMPACT, supra note 39, at 394. For a
discussion of the nonproliferation mandate, see infra notes 132-34 and accompanying
text.
110. Procedurally, the employer would move to revoke the union's certification on
the grounds that the union is dominated, influenced, or controlled by supervisors. Pursuant to § 9(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982), the Board retains the power to police
its certification of bargaining representatives and may revoke certification if it finds the
union disqualified as a bargaining representative. See, e.g., North Shore Univ. Hosp., 274
N.L.R.B. at 275-76; R & M Kaufman, 187 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1970).
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thority to the local employee units and permit the locals to become
the certified bargaining representatives of rank and file nurses.
4.

The Proposed Solution and Compromise: A Better Way of
Harmonizing the Competing Interests

Nurses associations should no longer seek recognition as the certified bargaining representatives of rank and file nurses. While this
proposal may at first appear to be a drastic measure, it may be the
only way to fulfill the Act's purposes while avoiding intrusive scrutiny which may undermine employees' organizational rights. If
state nurses associations no longer seek certification as collective
bargaining representatives but instead allow local units to seek certification, the associations may be able to insulate the bargaining
process from supervisory interference and avoid disqualification,
while remaining active in protecting nurses' interests in collective
bargaining.
It is well recognized that a labor organization may receive assistance and counsel from outside advisors.'
Thus, even if the state
associations are not the certified representatives of rank and file
nurses, they may still act as advisors to individual employee associations in much the same fashion as they currently do. By formally delegating bargaining authority, however, the associations
can avoid conflict of interest problems and pervasive internal
scrutiny.
Although the state nurses associations may lose some control
over the activities of the local associations by delegating bargaining
authority, as a general rule the state associations have already
given, or have argued that they have given, substantial autonomy
to the local bargaining units. Assuming that this is true, the state
associations arguably have little to lose by formalizing the arrangement and allowing each employee association to petition for certification as a bargaining representative.
In order to ensure that supervisors cannot exert improper influence over the bargaining activities, however, the local unit must be
truly independent and must not exist merely as a front for the state
association. 1 2 Otherwise, it may be found that the local is not a
"labor organization" but instead merely an organizing committee
for the state association. The local unit should establish its in111. Stevens Ford, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 907, 911 (1984).
112. See Sterling Processing Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 1783 (1958); Glove Workers'
Union, 116 N.L.R.B. 681 (1956); Oppenheimer, Collins & Co., 79 N.L.R.B. No. 59, aff'd
sub nom. White v. Herzog, 80 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1948).
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dependent existence not only by petitioning to become the certified
bargaining representative, but also by: (1) electing officers and
stewards, (2) adopting a constitution and bylaws, (3) requiring its
members to pay dues, (4) refusing to admit supervisors to membership, and (5) ensuring that only "employees" are active in the internal governance and administration of the local unit.1" 3
Although delegation of bargaining authority to the local unit
will not prevent employers from challenging the bona fides of the
local as a labor organization, it will achieve at least four goals.
First, it will avoid lengthening of representation proceedings. Second, it will avoid scrutiny into both the local unit's and the state
association's internal affairs under the North Shore University Hospital test. Third, it will insulate bargaining activities from the undue influence of supervisors. Finally this approach will avoid
dividing supervisors' loyalties.' 4
The first goal, avoiding protraction of representation proceedings, will be achieved because the Board has routinely dismissed
challenges to an organization's bona fide status as a labor organization when raised at the representation proceeding level." 5 The
Board has reasoned that such challenges are premature because the
organization has not been given the authority to bargain on behalf
of the petitioned-for unit employees. Generally, the Board requires
employers to bargain with the certified representative until it becomes apparent that the local does not meet the definition of a
"labor organization" or that it is merely a sham or front for another entity. "6
The second goal will be achieved because inquiry into the actual
practices and internal structure of the nurses association will be
unnecessary. The state association will not be the certified bargaining representative, and inquiry into the actual practices of the local
will be unnecessary because the local will not admit supervisors to
membership. If the bona fide status of the local is challenged, examination will be limited to whether the local is an independently
113. See International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. NLRB, 351 F.2d
771, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
114. At the present time, the constitutions of many state associations provide that
members who engage in activities inimical to the interests of the association may be disciplined. See, e.g., North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d at 275.
115. See, e.g., Litton Business Systems, 199 N.L.R.B. 354, 354 (1972); R & M Kaufman, 187 N.L.R.B. 134, 134-35 (1970).
116. R & M Kaufman, 187 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1970); Sterling Processing Corp., 119
N.L.R.B. 783 (1958); Glove Workers Union, 116 N.L.R.B. 681 (1956); Oppenheimer,
Collins & Co., 79 N.L.R.B. No. 59, aff'd sub nom. White v. Herzog, 80 F. Supp. 407
(D.D.C. 1948).
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functioning entity; in all likelihood only the relationship between
the local and the state nurses association, and the basic organizational structure of the local, will be examined. Assuming that the
local has a formal organizational structure and that it is not controlled by the state association, it should be able to withstand a
challenge to its bona fide status as a labor organization. 1 7
Delegation of bargaining authority will achieve the third and
fourth goals by permitting the local to establish its own bargaining
policies without supervisory interference and influence. The local
will be free from the influence which the state association is presently able to exert through its control of the purse, power of appointment, and establishment of overriding collective bargaining
goals. Moreover, if the local is an independent organization, supervisors will not be subject to the divided loyalties which currently exist. Because employees will belong to a separate,
independent organization, supervisors will have no allegiances arising from common membership in the professional association. The
independence of the local will restore both the labor/management
dichotomy and the balance of bargaining power. Thus, the effective delegation of bargaining authority to local units may best serve
the interests of all parties and best fulfill the Act's goal of achieving
industrial harmony while assuring employees the "fullest freedom"
in selecting a bargaining representative of their own choosing.
III.

THE NONPROLIFERATION MANDATE

In addition to the supervisory conflict-of-interest issue, another
issue has arisen in the health care labor area since the enactment of
the 1974 health care amendments. This issue concerns a congressional directive which instructed the Board to avoid the undue
proliferation of bargaining units in health care institutions. The
parallels between this issue and the supervisory exemption issue are
striking. The nonproliferation issue, like the supervisor issue, is
117. The local employee organization and the state association should strive to
achieve a true advisory/advocacy relationship analogous to that which exists between an
employer and its attorneys. The role of the state association would be similar to the role
that other unions have assumed in helping fledgling employee associations to achieve
their bargaining goals. In Haverhill Publishing Co., 1-RC-18,123 (1984), for example,
the Communication Workers of American (CWA) (1) assisted the Haverhill Publishing
Company's employees in organizing, (2) represented the local unit during the Board representation proceedings, and (3) vowed to assist the local unit during collective bargaining by serving as a member of the local's negotiating team. Despite the employer's efforts
to demonstrate that the employee association was merely a sham for the CWA, the Board
certified the bargaining representative and deemed the sham issue premature because the
employee association had not yet had an opportunity to engage in collective bargaining.
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marked by a clear expression of Congressional intent followed by
Board decisions which at least in part disregarded that intent in
order to further employees' "fullest freedom." As was the case in
the supervisor exemption area, the Board's proliferation decisions
led to much judicial criticism. Moreover, the Board's response to
that criticism, as expressed in the St. FrancisII decision, has, like
North Shore University Hospital, created many problems for health
care unions. Following is a discussion of the congressional nonproliferation mandate and the Board's treatment of the issue.
A.

The Nonprofit Hospital Exemption

Because the Board has jurisdiction only over representation
'
questions and unfair labor practices which "affect commerce,"118
there arose the issue of whether the Board's jurisdiction extended
to nonprofit hospitals. 119 In 1942, the Board determined that its
jurisdictional authority extended to virtually all work settings regulated under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and that there was no valid reason for denying employees of
nonprofit hospitals the benefits of the Act.' 2° As a result of the
Board's decision, Congress amended the Act in 1947 to exclude
nonprofit hospitals from the Act's coverage. 121
Although the legislative history pertaining to the exemption of
nonprofit hospitals is scant, Congressional reports indicate that
nonprofit hospitals were exempted from the Act's coverage for
three reasons: first, because they frequently assisted local governments in carrying out essential functions; 22 second, because they
were not engaged in commerce; 23 and finally, because the precarious financial condition of the health care industry would inhibit
health care employers from effectively participating in the Act's
118. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the Board's statutory and discretionary jurisdictional tests.
119. Under current discretionary standards, the Board will not assert jurisdiction
over a hospital unless the hospital has a gross annual revenue of at least $250,000. East
Oakland Community Health Alliance, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1975). It will not assert
jurisdiction over nursing homes, visiting nurses' associations and related facilities unless
the facility has an annual gross revenue of at least $100,000. Id.
120. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533, 542 (1942), afi'd,
145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
121. The 1947 amendment added the following italicized language to the Act's definition of an employer: "the term employer ...

shall not include ...

any corporation or

association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any
private shareholderor individual." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), reprinted in
LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 2 (emphasis added).
122.

LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 301.

123.

Id.
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collective bargaining process. 124 A common thread which underlies each of these reasons is the notion that essential services should
not be disrupted by strikes-a right guaranteed employees by section 7 of the Act. 125 Thus, Congress left the regulation of nonprofit
hospitals to the states because the hospitals were deemed to provide "essential" services. 126
B.

The Health Care Amendments of 1974

By 1974, it had become apparent that despite the exemption of
nonprofit hospitals from the Act's coverage, recognition strikes at
such hospitals were increasing. 127 As the number of strikes increased, the provision of health services to the public was disrupted. 28 Congress therefore decided to extend the Act's
protections and procedures to nonprofit health care institutions in
order to avoid the disruption and industrial strife caused by the
lack of any effective mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor
29
disputes.
Still concerned about the need to protect the public's interest in
undisrupted health care, however, and cognizant that the Act pro124. Id.
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
126. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in LEG. HIST. 1947,
supra note 33, at 303; 93 CONG. REC. 5129 (daily ed. May 12, 1947), reprintedin LEG.
HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 1464-65 (statement of Sen. Tydings); see also 93 CONG.
REC. 5124 (daily ed. May 12, 1947), reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1947, supra note 33, at 1464
(statement of Sen. Taft). The concerns which led to the exemption of nonprofit hospitals
are similar to those underlying the exemption of state and federal employers from the
Act. See generally Note, The NationalLabor Relations Board'sJurisdictionover Employers Contractingwith Exempt Public Entities, 62 B.U.L. REV. 1197, 1199-1203 (1982) (discussing policy reasons underlying the public employer exemption).
127. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
128. H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, at 272 (hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. 1974); CONFERENCE REPORT ON S.
3203, COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 22,941 (1974); S. 3203, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 12,934, 12,937 (1974) (statement of Sen. Cranston) and at 12,942
(statement of Sen. Taft).
129. LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note 128, at 95, 96, 291. In addition to the increasing
number of recognition strikes, the following developments made the nonprofit hospital
exemption ripe for reconsideration: (1) the rise in government and private insurance programs financing health care services; (2) the general shift from a manufacturing economy
to a service economy; (3) a new surge of trade activity in the federal and public sectors;
(4) the organization of low-wage and hospital workers with ties between collective bargaining and the civil rights movement; and (5) the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over
other eleemosynary, charitable, and educational institutions including private for-profit
hospitals and private for-profit as well as not-for-profit, nursing homes. IMPACT, supra
note 39, at 13-14.
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tects the employee's right to strike as a mechanism for equalizing
bargaining power, Congress enacted certain statutory safeguards
designed to mitigate against strikes and to alleviate their effects
should they occur. 130 Moreover, realizing that the threat to public
health is present regardless of whether the hospital is for-profit or
not-for-profit, Congress imposed the safeguards upon all hospitals
3
as well as upon other health care institutions.1 '
In addition to the statutory safeguards, Congress articulated another important safeguard of the public's interest in the legislative
history of the 1974 amendments. It directed the Board to avoid
the "undue proliferation of bargaining units" in health care institutions. 32 By issuing this directive, Congress expressed its concern
that a proliferation of bargaining units could result in work jurisdiction disputes, interference with health care teamwork, and excessive administrative costs.'33 Congress feared that these
problems could, in turn, lead to the closing of smaller hospitals or
to strike activity
which would disrupt the provision of health care
34
services.

130. Provisions added by the 1974 health care amendments included the following
requirements: (1) a party desiring to terminate or modify an agreement must provide
written notice to the other party at least 90 days prior to the contract's expiration date
(instead of the 60 days applicable to other industries); (2) federal and state mediation
agencies must be notified 60 days prior to the contract's expiration date (instead of 30
days); (3) mandatory mediation must occur during the 60 days prior to the contract's
expiration date (instead of the voluntary mediation required in other industries); and
(4) notice must be provided 10 days in advance of a strike and 45 days before a work
stoppage or picketing. The amendments also created a board of inquiry to help resolve
disputes before they reach the strike stage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), (g), 213 (1982). See
generally IMPACT, supra note 39, at 23-26.
131. The 1974 amendments added the following definition of "health care institution" to the Act: "any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization,
health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care
of a sick, infirm, or aged person." 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1982). See LEG. HIST. 1974,
supra note 128, at 95, 96, 291.
132. H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1974, supra
note 128, at 274; S. 3203, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 12,934-35 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft); IMPACT, supra note 39, at 394.
133. S. 3203, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 12,944-70 (1974); S. 3203, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 12,934-35 (1974). Similar efforts to avoid proliferation
have been made in the public sector. It is generally believed that reducing the number of
bargaining units in the public sector will best protect the public's interest in undisrupted
services. See generally Rock, The Approprate Unit Question in the Public Service: The
Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1001-08 (1969).
134. S. 3203, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 12,944-45 (1974), reprinted in
LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note 128, at 113-14 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft); 120 CONG.
REC. 12,968, 12,971 (1974), reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note 128, at 140, 142-43
(statements of Rep. Dominick); see also S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45,
reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note 128, at 51-52. See generally IMPACT, supra note
39, at 394.
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In an effort to guide the Board's determination of appropriate
units, Congress cited with approval several cases consistent with its
mandate.' 3 5 Congress also stated that the Board should examine
the "public interest" in making its determination. 3 6 The Board
has applied various tests in its effort to fulfill the mandate. Until
recently, however, the Board emphasized the interests of health
care employees in exercising the "fullest freedom" in selecting a
bargaining representative and apparently lost sight of the nonproliferation mandate.' 3 7
C. Bargaining Unit Determinations3 s

1. The Early Years
After the Act was amended in 1974, the Board initially adhered
135. Although Congress considered a proposal which would have limited the maximum number of bargaining units in health care institutions to four (professional, technical, clerical, and service and maintenance), it decided to leave appropriate unit
determination decisions to the Board's expertise. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120
CONG. REC. 12,944, reprinted in LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note 128, at 113-14 (statement of
Sen. Taft); S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1974, supra
note 128, at 12. Congress, however, directed the Board to avoid the undue proliferation
of bargaining units and cited with approval several decisions, including Four Seasons
Nursing Center, 208 N.L.R.B. 403 (1974) (dismissing petition seeking unit comprised
only of maintenance employees); Woodland Park Hosp., 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973) (dismissing petition for unit of x-ray technicians because separate unit would lead to fragmentation of units in the health care industry; appropriate unit consisted of all hospital
employees excluding professional and exempt employees); and Extendicare of W. Va.,
203 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1973) (cited with reservation because part of the unit findings were
overly broad and not consistent with minimization of the number of bargaining units in
health care institutions).
136. H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1974, supra
note 128, at 274; 120 CONG. REC. 22,575 (1974), reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note
128, at 363 (statement of Sen. Williams); 120 CONG. REc. 22,949 (1974), reprinted in
LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note 128, at 411 (statement of Rep. Ashbrook). Senator Williams
noted approvingly during congressional debates that: "the Board has, as a general rule,
tended to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of collective bargaining units among nonsupervisory employees, particularly where there is a history of grouping certain employees
together in the area of a notable disparity of interests between employees in different job
classifications." 120 CONG. REC. 22,575 (1974), reprintedin LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note
128, at 363 (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Taft, however, warned that:
Hospitals and other types of health care institutions are particularly vulnerable
to a multiplicity of bargaining units due to the diversified nature of the medical
services provided patients. If each professional interest and job classification is
permitted to form a separate bargaining unit, numerous administrative and labor relations problems become involved in the delivery of health care.
120 CONG. REC. 12,944 (1974), reprinted in LEG. HIsT. 1974, supra note 128, at 113
(statement of Sen. Taft).
137. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
138. Since the bargaining unit determination cases decided by the Board between
1974 and 1984 have been comprehensively discussed in other law review articles, this
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to the congressional directive against the undue proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry. In Shriners Hospital
for Crippled Children, 39 for example, the Board denied separate
representation to a group of five stationary engineers employed by
a hospital, stating that the engineers did not possess interests sufficiently "separate and distinct" to warrant separate representation. 40 The Board stated that separate units were inappropriate
because of the peculiar nature of the health care industry and the
high degree of integration of operations performed in health care
facilities. Separate units, the Board believed, would frustrate Congressional intent. 4 '
Following ShrinersHospital, however, the Board's adherence to
the congressional directive wavered. The Board began to focus
upon whether the petitioning employees shared a "community of
interests" rather than upon whether the interests were sufficiently
separate and distinct from those of the other employees to warrant
separate representation.' 42 During 1975, the Board identified at
least five basic units appropriate in health care institutions: (1) registered nurses, (2) all other professionals, (3) technicals (including
licensed practical nurses), (4) business office clericals, and (5) service and maintenance employees (including non-business office
clericals).' 43 Shortly thereafter, the Board found that a separate
unit of licensed practical nurses"44 and a separate unit of skilled
maintenance employees could also be appropriate in health care
article will merely present an overview of the 1974-84 decisions in order to provide a
background for discussion of the Board's St. Francis11 decision. For a comprehensive
analysis of the Board's unit determination cases prior to 1984, see Bumpass, Appropriate
Bargaining Units in Health Care Institutions, 20 B.C.L. REV. 867 (1979); Curly, Health
Care Unit Determinations.- The Board Ignores the Mandate of Congress and the Court of
Appeals, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 103 (1984); Stapp, Ten Years After: A Legal Framework
for Collective Bargainingin the HospitalIndustry, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63 (1984); Note,
The Nonproliferation Mandate and the Appropriate Legal Standard in Health Care
Bargaining Unit Determinations, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 663 (1983).
139. 217 N.L.R.B. 806 (1975).
140. Id. at 808.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also St. Francis Hosp., 265
N.L.R.B. 1025, 1029 (1982) [hereinafter cited as St. FrancisI].
143. Barnert Memorial Hosp. Center, 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 776-77 (1975) (technicals);
Mercy Hosp. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 767, 769 (1975) (registered nurses,
residual piofessionals); Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 217 N.L.R.B. 797, 798 (1975) (clericals); Newington Children's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 793, 794 (1975) (maintenance employees). See generally IMPACT, supra note 39, at 30-35.
144. Bay Medical Center, 218 N.L.R.B. 620 (1975), enf'd, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir.
1978); accord Res-Care, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 160 (1982), enf'd, 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir.
1983); Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 235 (1977).
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institutions.145 The Board then added another unit, physicians, to
its list.146 Thus, by 1977 the Board had found that there were at
least eight potentially appropriate units in health care institutions.
2. Judicial Criticism
Several federal courts of appeal attacked the Board's unit classifications as failing to heed the congressional admonition against
undue proliferation. 147 Six of the circuits criticized the Board's adherence to the community-of-interests standard and stated that the
Board should instead focus upon avoiding undue proliferation. 148
The circuit courts that found the community-of-interests test inappropriate disagreed as to how the congressional mandate against
undue proliferation could best be harmonized with the Act's goal
of protecting employees' organizational interests. These courts divided into the two schools of thought. Some advocated a disparityof-interests test which begins with a broad proposed unit and excludes employees with interests disparate from the overall group. 14 9
Other courts rejected the disparity-of-interests test because it subordinates employees' organizational interests to the public's interests in nonproliferation. 150 As an alternative, these courts proposed
a balancing test which weighs both employees' interests and the
15
public's interest. 1
3.

The Board's Response to the Courts' Criticism

The Board initially responded to the appellate courts' criticism
by announcing that it had properly taken into consideration the
145. See, e.g., Faulkner Hosp., 242 N.L.R.B. 47 (1979); St. Vincent's Hosp., 223
N.L.R.B. 638 (1976). In St. Francis Hosp., the Board noted that although there was no
reported decision in which a service employees unit was found appropriate, the appropriateness of such a unit could be inferred in the event that a separate maintenance unit was
recognized or certified. St. Francis1, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1028 n.28 (1982).
146. See Ohio Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 604, 605 (1977); IMPACT, supra note
39, at 112 n.36.
147. See St. Francis1, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1029 n.29 (1982).
148. Id.
149. The primary advocates of the disparity-of-interests test were the Ninth and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center v.
NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1979).
150. See, e.g., NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, Inc., 722 F.2d 1535 (11th
Cir. 1984); Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1983); Trustees
of Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1983).
151. NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11 th Cir.
1984); Trustees of Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 641 (2d Cir. 1983); Allegheny
Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally Stapp, supra note
138, at 63, 77-79.
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mandate against undue proliferation. 5 2 The Board stated that it
had erred in its decisions not by failing to heed congressional in53
tent, but rather by failing to explain fully the Board's approach.
To support its decisions, the Board stated that it had been applying
a two-tiered analysis which safeguarded against the proliferation of
bargaining units. 4 Under this analysis, the Board first determined
whether the group seeking representation fell into one of the seven
groups of employees commonly found within health care institutions."'55 If the group seeking representation did not meet the first
part of the test, the Board would dismiss the petition unless "extraordinary and compelling facts" justified the certification of a
smaller unit.'56 If the group did meet the first prong, the Board
proceeded to the second step of the analysis, applying communityof-interests standards to ascertain if the group constituted an appropriate unit. 157 A majority of the Board reasoned that this
screening system limited the number of bargaining units to sevenabsent compelling circumstances-and thus satisfied the Board's
15
obligation to protect against undue proliferation.

D. St. Francis II
1. The Board's Decision
In response to mounting criticism, however, the Board in 1984
reconsidered its two-tiered analysis, and formulated a revised approach for determining appropriate health care bargaining units.
In St. FrancisHospital ("St. Francis11n"),159 the Board determined
that the community of interests approach was contrary to Congres152. St. Francis1, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1029 (1982).
153. Id. at 1030.
154. Id. at 1029.
155. The seven groups were: physicians, registered nurses, other professional employees, technical employees, business office clerical employees, service and maintenance
employees and skilled maintenance employees. St. Francis1, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1029
(1982). While the Board at one time included licensed practical nurses (LPN's) as a
separate unit, it generally included the LPN's in the unit of technical employees. See,
e.g., Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1706, 1706 (1977) (discussing appropriateness of separate LPN unit).
156. St. Francis 1,265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1029 (1982).
157. Id.
158. Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter dissented sharply from the decision. St. Francis1, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1042 (1982) (Van de Water, Chairman & Hunter,
Member, dissenting). The dissenters argued that the traditional community-of-interest
test was an improper standard for unit determination in the health care industry, and that
the disparity-of-interests test was the only method by which undue proliferation could be
avoided. Id.
159. 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984) [hereinafter cited as St. FrancisII].
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sional intent. 60 After analyzing the legislative history of the 1974
amendments and the comments of the appellate courts, the Board
concluded that Congress, concerned with minimizing the disruption in patient care, could hardly have envisioned the large number
of Board-sanctioned units which resulted from the Board's traditional approach.' 6' Agreeing with the majority of the circuits, the
Board recognized that Congress must have intended that it apply a
standard stricter than the traditional community-of-interests
test. 162
The Board, however, declined to adopt either the rigid disparityof-interests test advocated by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits or the
balancing test advocated by the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. 163 Instead, it adopted a modified disparity-of-interests test
designed to effectuate the Board's "dual obligations of adhering to
the legislative intent behind the enactment of the 1974 health care
amendments to the Act and guaranteeing the representational interests of health care employees."' 64
Under the Board's new test, the appropriateness of the petitioned-for unit is to be judged in terms of "normal community of
interests criteria," ' 65 but sharper than usual differences between the
wages, hours, and working conditions of the petitioning employees
160. Id. at 952.
161. Id. at 951.
162. Id.
163. The Board rejected the rigid disparity-of-interests test because it would generally
result in only two units, professionals and nonprofessionals, ever being found appropriate.
Under that approach, a smaller unit would be found appropriate only if the interests of
the petitioned-for unit employees were so divergent from those of other employees that
fair representation would be prohibited or inhibited if a separate unit were not permitted.
Id. at 16 (citing Trustees of Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 636 (2d Cir. 1983);
Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1983)).
A "professional employee" is defined by the Act as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character... (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in
its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
(iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, ...;or
(b) any employee who (i) has completed the course of specialized intellectual
instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify
himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1982).
164. St. FrancisI1,271 N.L.R.B. at 948.
165. "Normal community of interests criteria" include employees' wages, hours, and
working conditions; qualifications, training, and skills; frequency of contact and degree of
interchange with other employees; frequency of transfer to and from the petitioned-for
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and those in an existing unit are required for the Board to approve
the smaller unit. 16 6 The Board reasoned that requiring greater disparities would result in fewer units. It thus concluded that the test
would meaningfully
apply the congressional mandate against unit
67
proliferation.
The Board did not, however, adopt "what bordered on a per se
approach" 168 by invariably establishing large units based solely on
professional or nonprofessional status. 69 Stating that the princi70
ples announced represented a clear rejection of Board precedent,
the Board vowed to reach its unit determinations on a case-by-case
basis, focusing upon the differences shown between the petitionedfor unit employees and the other employees and the similarities
among the proposed unit members.' 7 '
Applying the new test to the facts, the Board found that there
was not a sufficient disparity of interests between the petitioned-for
unit of maintenance employees and other nonprofessionals to justify separate representation. 172 The Board specifically focused
upon the similarities between the employees in the petitioned-for
unit and the employees in the overall nonprofessional unit. The
Board noted, among other similarities, that the petitioning employees had significant and frequent work contact with nearly all categories of health care employees. 73 In examining the disparities
between the petitioning employees and the employees in the overall
unit; commonality of supervision; degree of work function integration; area practice and
patterns of collective bargaining; and collective bargaining history. Id. at 953.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 954.
171. Id. at 953, 953 n.39. The majority stated that the courts, always cognizant of
the congressional mandate against unit proliferation, have upheld units limited to technical employees and service and maintenance employees. Id. at 953 (citing Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Hillview Health
Care Center, 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Sweetwater Hosp. Ass'n, 604 F.2d
454, 458 (6th Cir. 1979); Bay Medical Center v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1978);
Trustees of Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 641 (2d Cir. 1983)). The Board, however, cautioned that no unit would be found per se appropriate and that separate representation would have to be justified by the factual record. St. FrancisI1,271 N.L.R.B. at
954.
172. St. Francis11, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954.
173. Id. The Board also noted that the service and maintenance employees received
the same hourly pay and fringe benefits, that labor relations were centrally controlled,
that there was a uniform discipline and discharge system, and that there had been 78
transfers between the service and maintenance departments. Id.
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unit, 4 the Board found that they were not sufficient to justify separate representation." 5 The Board did, however, remand the matter to the regional
director to allow the parties to present further
6
evidence.

2.

7

Reversion to Old Standards under the New Test

In theory, the Board's modified disparity-of-interests test should
result in fewer and larger units being found appropriate in health
care institutions because the test focuses upon "disparities" and because the party seeking the smaller unit bears the burden of establishing its appropriateness.' 77 Recent Board decisions, however
have applied the test in a manner which merely perpetuates earlier
findings regarding appropriate units. Although the Board in St.
FrancisII announced that it was rejecting all of its prior unit determination decisions, it has in fact continued to analyze the appropriateness of the petitioned-for unit with reference to previously
established employee groupings-for example, technicals, service
and maintenance employees, and professionals. 7 ' Moreover, as
under the previously applied community-of-interests test, the
Board has continued to focus upon the similarities among the employees in the petitioned-for unit and their dissimilarities to the
overall unit. Despite the test articulated in St. Francis II, the
Board has failed to focus upon the similarities between the employees in the petitioned-for unit and other employees. ' 9 The Board
has thus perpetuated preexisting unit determinations.
In Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Inc. ,180 for example, the

Board found a petitioned-for unit of all technical employees appropriate, rather than a unit of all nonprofessional employees as requested by the employer. Rather than beginning its analysis
without any preconceived notions about appropriate groupings, the
Board first grouped together all "technical" employees and applied
a strict community-of-interests analysis to assess which employees
174. Id. The Board noted that the petitioned-for unit employees did not perform
functions requiring a high degree of skill. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Under the community-of-interests test, the party seeking the larger unit, generally the employer, had the burden of establishing that other employees should be included
in the unit. Under the disparity-of-interests test, the burden is shifted to the party seeking
the smaller unit, generally the union. See St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982).
178. See Southern Md. Hosp. Center, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 212, 1985-86 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) 17,276 (1985).
179. Id.
180. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 212, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
17,276 (1985).
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should appropriately be found "technical" employees as previously
defined by the Board. 181 It then compared the dissimilarities between the "technical" employees and those employees traditionally
placed in a "service and maintenance" unit. 182 By presupposing
the apropriateness of these two basic groupings of nonprofessional
employees, 183 the Board highlighted the technical employees' community of interests in order to demonstrate the disparity of interemployees and the service and
ests between the technical
184
maintenance employees.
If the Board had abandoned its preconceived notions about appropriate employee groupings and had required the union to
demonstrate "sharper than usual differences" in order to justify a
separate unit for the petitioners, arguably an all-inclusive nonprofessional unit would have been found appropriate. The record
demonstrated that the employer's labor policies, including disciplinary policies, were centralized; that all employees received the
same benefits and were subject to the same wage scale; that employees were permanently transferred to otherdepartments on
twenty-three occasions in the past several years; and that there was
considerably daily interaction between the employees in the petitioned-for unit and other hospital employees because of the use of
the team concept of patient care. 18 5 By narrowly focusing on the
differences between the technical employees and the service and
maintenance employees, however, the Board was able to justify a
separate unit by finding sufficient dissimilarities in wages, qualifications, skills, and training and by finding only minimal interchange
between these two groups of employees.
By focusing on the similarities among the petitioned-for unit employees and the dissimilarities between those employees and em181. For example, the Board included a draftsman in the petitioned-for unit, since he
met the definition of a technical employee, but it excluded various technicians because
29,713-14.
they did not meet the definition of a "technical employee." Id. at
182. Id. at 29,713.
183. The Board's continued willingness to presuppose the appropriateness of separate
professional and nonprofessional units is also demonstrated by the recent decision Victor
Valley Community Hosp., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1985). In Victor Valley, the Board
stated that the disparity-of-interests test did not change the composition of the all-professional unit and that nonprofessional employees could not appropriately be included in the
unit. Id., slip op. at 3.
184. Id., slip op. at 2-3. The Board found that the following disparities justified a
separate unit: a 25% to 35% difference in wages between service and maintenance employees and technical employees; differences in qualifications, training and skills between
the two groups; the lack of interchange; and few permanent transfers between the two
groups.
185. Id.
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ployees in the overall unit, the Board has in effect continued to
apply a community-of-interests analysis. This approach will not
necessarily result in the nonproliferation of bargaining units. At
best, it will limit the number of bargaining units to those major
categories recognized as appropriate prior to St. Francis //.186
The Board's two most recent decisions, however, suggest that it
may have recognized that the failure to abandon preconceived notions about appropriate employee groupings and to properly focus
on the similarities and dissimilarities between the smaller unit and
the overall unit merely perpetuated prior unit determination decisions. In both of these recent decisions, the Board has properly
applied the disparity-of-interests test, and found larger units
appropriate.
In North Arundel Hospital Association s7 , the Board found that
the smallest appropriate unit consisted of all of the employer's professional employees. It rejected the regional director's finding that
there were disparities between the interests of registered nurses and
other professionals sufficient to warrant the separate unit of registered nurses sought by the petitioning union. By focusing on the
similarities and differences between the registered nurses and the
employer's other professionals, the Board concluded that the union
had failed to establish that "sharper than usual differences existed"
between the registered nurses and other professional employees. 88
Similarly, in Baker Hospital, Inc.,
the Board included service
186. The Board's decisions suggest that subgroups of these broad groups will generally not be found appropriate. See, e.g., St. Luke's Memorial Hosp., 274 N.L.R.B. No.
202, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,278 (1985) (separate licensed practical nurse unit
not appropriate); St. Francis11, 271 N.L.R.B. at 952 (separate maintenance unit not
appropriate).
187. 279 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1986).
188. Id., slip op. at 4-5. The Board relied on the fact that all professional employees
were subject to many common personnel policies and procedures, and that there was
employee contact and interaction as a result of the employer's team concept of health
care delivery and the registered nurses' participation on various hospital committees with
other professionals.
Although the Board noted that there was little evidence of interchange of duties, it
concluded that such lack of interchange was inherent in the health care industry. In fact,
the Board chastized the regional director for relying on distinct job responsibilities and
departmental organization to support his finding that a separate registered nurse unit was
appropriate. The Board stated that
carried to its logical extreme, the Regional Director's rationale could result in
separate units for professionals in the pharmacy, physical therapy, radiology/
CT/nuclear medicine, laboratory/pathology, patient services, respiratory/pulmonary, and social work departments-a result plainly at odds with the congressional directive against unit proliferation.
Id.
189. 279 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1986).
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and maintenance employees, technical employees and clerical employees in a single bargaining unit. Although the groups were supervised separately and worked in different departments, the Board
found that there was an insufficient disparity of interests to justify
separate units. The Board noted that the employees shared significant work-related contact and had many common terms and conditions of employment. 190

Thus, as these recent decisions reflect, the disparity-of-interests
test as properly applied will result in Board findings that larger
units are appropriate in health care institutions. It will, as a result,
better fulfill the Congressional mandate against undue proliferation of bargaining units.
E. Analysis
In 1974, Congress amended the Act to extend its protections to
employees of nonprofit health care institutions because labor unrest among hospital employees was leading to recognition strikes
and there was no effective mechanism for resolving the disputes. 91
In extending the rights secured by the Act to nonprofit hospital
workers, however, Congress enacted various procedural safeguards
designed to increase peaceful dispute resolution as an alternative to
strikes, which were disrupting health care services to the public. 192
The nonproliferation mandate was adopted by Congress as one
means of achieving industrial harmony in the health care industry. 193 According to Congress, the Board was to consider the public interest when making unit determination decisions. 194
Legislative history expressly stated that if each of the employee
groups found in health care institutions were permitted to organize
into separate units, the public's interest would not be achieved. 195
Congress was concerned that fragmentation would result in excessive competition among rival organizations, work jurisdiction disputes, whipsawing of health care employees,196 and the ultimate
190. Factors upon which the Board relied included the following: all of these employees were paid hourly; they punched the same time clock; they received the same costof-living adjustments; all were offered the same pension plan; hospital policies, personnel
rules and disciplinary procedures were the same for all; and they all shared the same
cafeteria, parking facility and bulletin boards.
191. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
195. LEG. HIST. 1974, supra note 128, at 12, 274.
196. The multiplicity of units can make it difficult, if not impossible, for employers to
maintain uniformity in benefits and working conditions. See Rock, supra note 133, at
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breakdown of peaceful bargaining. 97
From 1974 until 1984, however, the Board applied traditional
community-of-interests standards and, contrary to the intent of
Congress, certified virtually every petitioned-for group of health
care workers as a separate appropriate unit. 98 This failure to heed
the congressional admonition contributed to an increase in the
number of strikes in the health care industry following the enactment of the 1974 amendments.' 9 9 Thus, it is apparent that the
community-of-interests test not only violated congressional intent,
but also resulted in the very end which the nonproliferation mandate was designed to avoid.
The St. Francis II test, strictly applied, should result in fewer,
larger units being found appropriate in health care institutions. It
therefore not only fulfills the mandate but also should result in decreased strike activity in the health care industry. 2°° The laxity
with which the Board until most recently applied the test, 20 1 however, will merely perpetuate the Board's prior unit determination
findings and the fragmentation of interests which led to strikes in
health care institutions over the past twelve years. 2
F

Fulfillment of the Mandate Through Strict Application of the
Disparity-of-Interests Test

As a general rule, unions prefer to organize smaller units composed of employees with similar skills, interests, and job functions
because smaller groups are more easily organized and competing
interests more easily harmonized.2 0 3 Employers, on the other
hand, normally seek the largest possible unit in order to reduce the
number of negotiating sessions with different bargaining agents and
limit the potential for work slowdowns and disruption. 2°1 The St.
Francis II test requires unions to organize larger units-or to
1001-08; Shaw & Clark, Determination of AppropriateBargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal and PracticalProblems, 51 ORE. L. REV. 152, 152-54, 157-58 (1971).
197. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
198. See generally Curly, Health Care Unit Determinations: The Board Ignores the
Mandate of Congress and the Court of Appeals, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63 (1984).
199. Id.
200. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
203. Note, The Nonproliferation Mandate and the Appropriate Legal Standard in
Health Care Bargaining Unit Determinations, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 663, 667 n.20
(1983) (citing Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Health Care
Institutions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 285-86 (1975)).
204. Note, supra note 203, at 667 n.20 (citing Feheley, supra note 203, at 285-86).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 17

demonstrate that there is such a disparity of interests between the
petitioned-for employees and the employees in the all-professional
or all-nonprofessional unit that separate representation of the
smaller unit is appropriate. 20 5 The test adheres to the nonprolifera-

tion mandate by permitting separate units of employees only when
there are "greater than usual disparities" between the wages,
hours, and working conditions of the employees in the petitionedfor unit and those of the larger group.2 °6
If the mandate is to be fulfilled, however, the Board must
(1) abandon its prior unit determination decisions and begin anew
to establish appropriate groupings of health care employees, and
(2) examine the community of interests and the disparity of interests between the petitioned-for unit employees and the employees
in the larger group, rather than examining the similarities among
the petitioned-for employees and their dissimilarities to employees
in the larger unit. Otherwise, as demonstrated by the Board's decisions immediately following its announcement of the St. FrancisH
test,2 °7 previous unit determination findings will merely be perpetuated and the new test will at most disallow the splintering of
groups from the Board's basic employee units (registered nurses,
205. Although some commentators have interpreted the disparity-of-interests test as
merely a more rigid community-of-interests test, the disparity test, properly applied,
should have a major impact upon the organizing efforts of health care unions. Under the
community-of-interests test, the employer bore the burden of demonstrating that other
groups of employees should be included within the unit and that they share a community
of interests with the petitioned-for employees. The St. Francis11 test reverses this burden, and does not permit the union to organize the smaller unit unless (1) it can sustain
the burden of justifying the smaller unit or (2) it is willing to risk dismissal of the petition
if it cannot demonstrate a sufficient showing of interest among the employees in the larger
unit, which may be found appropriate.
Under the community-of-interests test, health care unions could easily restrict representation to the smallest group because the Act only requires the Board to certify "an"
appropriate unit, not "the" most appropriate unit. Because smaller, more homogeneous
groups of employees are easier to organize, the community-of-interests test made it easier
for unions to gain recognition and to represent the interests of smaller groups of
employees.
206. As a result of the breadth of the new units, certain associations which catered to
particular employee groups such as licensed practical nurses or registered nurses may
have to amend their constitutions in order to represent categories of employees who traditionally were not allowed to become members of the union. Admitting other groups of
employees may be unsavory to the nurses unions, which have traditionally undertaken
bargaining as only one of many efforts to further nurses' interests. Following the Board's
decision in North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, see supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text, a
spokesperson for the American Nurses Association stated that the disparity-of-interests
test applied in that case set a "dangerous precedent for the rights of nurses around the
country, who have been negotiating through unique professional entities since 1974."
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-4 (Jun. 3, 1986).
207. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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other professionals, technicals, business office clericals, and service
and maintenance employees).2 °8
In order to encourage the Board to apply properly the St. Francis HI test, employers should protest union and Board references to
employee groups in terms of units found appropriate prior to the
St. Francis 1H decision. Moreover, employers should require the
Board to examine each separate job classification (both in the petitioned-for unit and in the overall unit) to ascertain whether there
are "sharper than usual" disparities of interest among the employees in the various job classifications which warrant the exclusion of
a particular group from the bargaining unit. Through such an examination, the congressional mandate against proliferation will be
fulfilled and appropriate employee groupings may become apparent. 2 9 Without careful examination of the particular work functions and employee interrelationships in each health care
institution, however, the Board cannot properly fulfill the mandate
against undue proliferation.
Until the factors and employee groupings become clear as applied over time, unions will be well advised to seek to organize the
largest potentially appropriate unit within the health care institution. Employers have unfortunately been given the opportunity to
protract representation proceedings by appealing the regional director's unit determination decision to the Board.21 ° If the union
does not wish to undertake the expensive and time consuming task
of organizing broader units of employees across various job categories, it risks having an election petition dismissed if the Board finds
that a group larger than the petitioned-for unit is appropriate. 2 '1

208. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
209. Over time, for example, the Board may find that licensed practical nurses (generally included in a technical unit), registered nurses (generally included in a separate
unit), and social workers (generally included in a residual professional unit) should be
included in a single unit because there are not "sharper than usual differences" in their
wages, hours and working conditions to justify separate representation.
The Board may also find that particular employee groupings are appropriate in certain
types of health care institutions, and that other groupings are appropriate in other types
of health care institutions. For example, in a psychiatric hospital which emphasizes "milieu therapy," perhaps a wall-to-wall unit would be appropriate because the employees
have frequent daily work contact, similar hours of employment, and similar benefits, and
because all employees are involved in the patient care and rehabilitation process. In a
large, highly departmentalized acute care hospital, on the other hand, perhaps two or
more units would be found appropriate.
210. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
211. In order for the Board to order an election, the union must have a 30% showing
of interest among the employees in the unit found appropriate for bargaining. NLRB,
STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE § 101.18. Prior to organizing election drives, health care
employers can enhance the likelihood that an all-professional, all-nonprofessional, or all-
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Although the St. FrancisHI disparity-of-interests test may make
it more difficult for unions to organize health care workers, and
may not allow every employee group's interests to be represented,
the test should avoid the undue proliferation of bargaining units.
It therefore will achieve the Act's overriding goal of promoting industrial harmony. Moreover, when properly applied, the test respects employees' organizational rights by permitting separate
representation whenever the disparities between the overall group
and the petitioned-for unit outweigh the similarities.
IV.

EVALUATION OF ST. FRANCIS II AND NORTH SHORE
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL IN LIGHT OF THE PURPOSES OF
THE ACT AND THE INTENT UNDERLYING
THE AMENDMENTS

The St. FrancisHI and North Shore University Hospital decisions
have caused much turmoil in the health care industry and, at least
in the short term, have made it more costly and burdensome for
unions to organize health care workers. Professional organizations
have been required to reevaluate their internal structures and
membership rules,2" 2 organize larger units of employees,21 3 and defend challenges to their qualifications as bargaining representatives
of rank and file employees.214 In many cases, labor organizations
have withdrawn representation petitions rather than risking disqualification or bearing the burden and expense of organizing
larger, more diverse groups of health care workers.21 5
Although the decisions have caused much upheaval, the purpose
of the Act and the legislative history of the 1947 and 1974 amendments suggest that the tests announced in these two decisions further congressional intent. The overriding purpose of the Act is to
promote industrial harmony by reducing strikes and other forms of
employee unit will be found appropriate by seeking to establish a community of interests
among employees in a wide range of job classifications. They can, for example, (1) ensure
that employees interact both in patient care duties and on break, (2) establish a uniform
wage scale and benefits, (3) subject all employees to the same personnel policies, and
(4) where possible, provide for transfers between employee classifications.
212. Compare Massachusetts Nurses Association Constitution and By-laws of 1983
with Massachusetts Nurses Association Constitution and By-laws of 1985.
213. ST. FRANCIS MONITOR (BNA May 1985).
214. Id.
215. In almost one-half of the cases in which the Board's regional directors have
addressed the issue of the appropriate unit, the Board has revoked the union's certification, dismissed the petition, or allowed the union voluntarily to withdraw its petition due
to the inappropriateness of the unit. ST. FRANCIS MONITOR (BNA Mar. 1986). In approximately one-quarter of the remaining cases, the regional director's unit determination
decision was appealed. Id.
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unrest which have the effect of burdening and obstructing commerce. 21 6 As a means to this end, Congress sought to equalize the
bargaining power between employees and their employers.2"' The
Board's sanctioning of supervisors' participation in rank and file
unions and its failure to adhere to the mandate against undue
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry have
upset the balance of power and have undermined the purposes of
the Act. The tests announced in North Shore University Hospital
and St. Francis H will better equalize bargaining power between
employers and employees and will, therefore, better effectuate the
Act's ultimate purpose of reducing or eliminating labor unrest.
V.

CONCLUSION

In order to achieve the overriding goal of the Act, the Board
should strictly apply both the North Shore University Hospital allrelevant-circumstances test and the St. Francis II disparity-of-interests test. Without the reasonable limitations which these tests
impose upon health care employees' "fullest freedom," we are
likely to see another decade of turmoil and disruption in the health
care industry. That would be inimical to the interests of employees, employers and the public, all of whom have much to gain by
harmonious labor relations.

216.
217.

29 U. .C. § 151 (1982); see supra note 2.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158(b)(5) (1982).

